Roadmap

The OpenWhistle roadmap: what comes next, and only that. Everything released is in the Changelog, rendered from CHANGELOG.md.

Ordering principle

Breadth before depth. Release 2.6.0 changes how every deployment receives and connects reports. Release 2.7.0 changes how every deployment stores them. v2.8.0 adds modules for specific German regulations (LkSG, KWG, CSRD), useful to some operators only. The order is a plan, not a promise: it moves when a reason turns up.

v2.6.0 — Multi-Channel Intake & Integration Hooks

More ways to receive a report, and hooks into compliance tooling (SIEM, GRC, ticketing) that never expose case content.

Additional submission channels

  • Email intake
    • Mail to INTAKE_EMAIL_ADDRESS becomes a pending report, attachments included.
    • A case number and PIN go back only to a sender who gave a return address.
    • One intake address per organisation in multi-tenant deployments.
    • Built on aiosmtplib or IMAP polling.
  • Voice recording
    • Recorded in the browser (Web Audio API, MediaRecorder), stored as an .ogg or .webm attachment.
    • Played back in the case view.
    • Optional pitch shift against speaker identification: VOICE_DISTORTION_ENABLED=true, server-side with ffmpeg.
  • Phone and in-person reports
    • §16 Abs. 3 HinSchG requires oral reporting and, on request, a meeting in person.
    • A handler records a report taken by phone or in a meeting as a case; the reporter gets the case number and PIN like any other.
    • The record follows §11 HinSchG: a transcript or summary, shown to the reporter to check and correct.
    • A reporter can ask for a meeting from the status page; the request is a message in the case, with its own deadline.

Reporter anonymity

  • Connection status: the submit and status pages say whether the report arrives over the onion service, before anything is typed.
  • Onion-only mode
    • REPORTER_ONION_ONLY=true: the clearnet address shows only the onion address and how to open it; reports are accepted over Tor alone.
    • Admin routes stay on the clearnet address.

Integration hooks

  • Admin management API
    • Users, categories, locations and system health; no case content, nothing that identifies a whistleblower.
    • JWT Bearer tokens with scoped API keys: api_keys (key_hash, scopes[], expires_at), managed on the admin settings page.
    • OpenAPI spec at /api/v1/openapi.json; rate-limited per key.
    • Lets GRC and ITSM tools provision OpenWhistle without the admin UI.
  • Aggregate statistics API: read-only, anonymised counts per period, category and status for compliance dashboards.
  • Outbound webhooks
    • Events report.created, report.status_changed, report.reply_added, report.deleted, each switchable.
    • Payload: event type and count, sent with the notification digest (NOTIFICATION_BATCH_MINUTES), never at the moment of the event. No case number, no time, no message, attachment or identifying metadata: the rule webhook notifications already follow, as a third party must not learn which case moved or when (Notifications).
    • Signed with HMAC-SHA256 in X-OpenWhistle-Signature; retried up to 3× with exponential back-off.
    • Delivery log in the admin UI; WebhookEndpoint model (url, secret, enabled_events[], last_delivery_at, last_status_code).
  • Zapier / n8n guide: examples for Zapier, n8n and Make in docs/integrations/. Documentation only, no code change.

Access control

  • IP allowlist for admin routes
    • ADMIN_IP_ALLOWLIST takes CIDR ranges (192.168.1.0/24,10.0.0.0/8); outside them, 403.
    • Unset or empty: no restriction, as today.
    • Enforced by the bundled nginx on /admin only, never in the app. The app keeps never seeing a client address (anonymity layer 2), and the whistleblower routes stay open to everyone. Behind a load balancer, nginx's set_real_ip_from names the trusted proxies; the address is checked, never logged or passed on.

Design system

  • DESIGN.md to the depth of easywall's design spec
    • It has held the "Signal" tokens since v1.3.0, but not component states, motion rules or per-pattern accessibility notes.
    • The goal: a design system the next contributor follows instead of reverse-engineering the CSS.

v2.7.0 — End-to-End Encryption

Today the server encrypts a report at rest but can read it. From v2.7.0 it cannot: a report is readable only with the reporter's PIN or a handler's key.

Encryption

  • Per-report keys
    • Description, messages and attachments are encrypted in the browser, to the reporter and to the organisation's handlers.
    • The reporter's key is derived from the PIN.
    • A handler's private key never leaves the browser. A passphrase of its own unlocks it, as OIDC and LDAP logins have no local password.
    • A database dump, a backup or the operator of the server reads ciphertext only.
  • Key recovery: a recovery key shown once at setup, split between two people if the organisation wants. It opens every case when no handler's key is left.

Open questions

  • Metadata stripping, virus scan, full-text search and the PDF export run on the server today and need the plaintext. Each moves to the browser or works only on what the handler opens.
  • Migration: existing cases are re-encrypted when a handler first opens them after the upgrade.

v2.8.0 — Compliance Expansion (LkSG, KWG, CSRD)

Obligations beyond HinSchG, as add-on modules that leave the whistleblower flow unchanged. LkSG (since 2023) needs a supply-chain channel, KWG a banking one; CSRD disclosures refer to internal reporting systems.

Supply chain due diligence (LkSG)

  • LkSG reporting channel
    • A separate form with the §2 LkSG violations as categories: forced labour, child labour, environmental violations, discrimination, excessive working hours and more.
    • Routed to a configurable LkSG case manager role.
    • §12 LkSG deadlines: receipt within 7 days, decision within 3 months, extension to 6 months documented.
    • Switched on by LKSG_ENABLED=true.
  • LkSG transparency report: the annual report of §10 Abs. 2 LkSG (complaints, investigations, measures) as a PDF; LKSG_TRANSPARENCY_YEAR.

Financial sector (KWG / MaRisk)

  • KWG / MaRisk channel
    • Categories for §25a KWG and MaRisk AT 8.5: risk management violations, fraud, AML breaches.
    • Routed to a Compliance/Audit role, with its own admin nav section; KWG_ENABLED=true.

Sustainability reporting (CSRD)

  • CSRD / ESG grievance channel
    • Environmental impact, human rights and social violations, as CSRD requires of large companies from 2025.
    • Categorised by ESRS topic, routed to an ESG officer role; CSRD_ENABLED=true.

Compliance documentation

  • ISO 37002 alignment: docs/iso37002.md maps every ISO 37002:2021 clause to a feature or setting, for auditors. Updated per release.
  • 30 languages
    • From five locales (EN, DE, FR, ES, PT-BR) to every official EU language.
    • New: IT, PL, NL, PT, SV, DA, FI, CS, SK, HU, RO, BG, HR, SL, ET, LV, LT, MT, GA, EL.
    • Formal and informal variants for DE/AT/CH.
    • Machine-translated first, then reviewed by native speakers, in app/locales/{lang}.json with the existing key schema.
    • Translators work in Weblate's free hosting for open source projects and need no Git; Weblate opens the pull requests.

Case handling workflow

  • Case redaction
    • Replace any passage of a description or message with [REDACTED] before a case is shared outside.
    • Logged in the audit log; the original is kept in an encrypted redaction log only a superadmin sees.
  • Anonymization / pseudonymization: one click replaces personal identifiers with placeholders (name → [Person A]) in a copy for auditors or regulators. The original stays.
  • Per-case tasks
    • Description, assignee, due date, status (open / in progress / done), visible to the admin team only.
    • Task deadlines are tracked apart from the HinSchG ones.
    • AdminTask model (report_id, assigned_to_id, due_date, completed_at).
  • Case-level access control
    • Restricts a sensitive case to named admins, on top of roles.
    • Others see its case number on the dashboard but cannot open it.
    • CaseRestriction model linking report_id to allowed admin_user_ids.

External collaboration

  • External advisor access
    • Time-limited guest access for law firms, auditors and external ombudspersons, at /advisor/{token} without an admin login.
    • Read cases and add internal notes; never change status or delete. Revocable at once, logged in the audit trail.
    • ExternalAdvisor model (email, access_token as a GUID, expires_at, allowed_report_ids[]).
  • Communication templates
    • Reviewed wording that admins insert into replies and notifications, per organisation.
    • MessageTemplate model (title, body_de, body_en, body_fr).

Reporting & transparency

  • Transparency report
    • An annual PDF + JSON from /admin/stats, for reports to management. The HinSchG asks yearly figures only of the external offices (§ 26 Abs. 1).
    • Totals, by category, status at year-end, average processing time, SLA compliance rate, share closed in time.
  • Handler department on the status page: the team's department label, never a name; SHOW_HANDLER_DEPARTMENT=true, per organisation.

Already released

Every shipped release, newest first, is on the Changelog page. The latest, v2.5.1, fixes a wrong default on the System page. Version 2.5.0 tells admins on the dashboard when their version has a published security advisory. Version 2.4.2 was a security patch. It updated pypdf and pyasn1 (eleven CVEs) and ended a stolen admin session with the password change. It also kept the reporter's address out of a full nginx disk's log, and § 17 deadlines now end with their last day. Version 2.4.1 refused a crafted PDF that could stall the anonymous channel. Version 2.4.0 added branding and linked the external reporting offices and the operator's legal notices from every page.