Changelog

The OpenWhistle changelog: the unreleased changes and the newest 5 releases. Before that: older releases. Rendered from CHANGELOG.md, the file GitHub and the release tooling read.

2.5.1 — 2026-11-04

Fixed

  • /admin/system listed the default of UPDATE_CHECK_ENABLED as false; 2.5.0 made it true. The configuration table now reads both defaults from the settings model.

See the code changes between 2.5.0 and 2.5.1

2.5.0 — 2026-11-04

Added

  • Admins hear when their version has a published security advisory. When the running version falls in an advisory's range, /admin/system lists each advisory with its severity, GHSA/CVE link and the release that fixes it, and the dashboard shows a banner to the admins who can update the instance. The match is made when the page is rendered, so the notice is gone right after an upgrade.

Changed

  • The update check is now on by default, and it no longer contacts GitHub. An upgraded installation makes an outbound request it did not make before: once a day, GET https://openwhistle.net/security.json (latest release and security advisories; format in docs-tech/security-feed.md). It carries no instance or report data, and the User-Agent is OpenWhistle without a version; the site sees the server's IP address and logs nothing. Set UPDATE_CHECK_ENABLED=false to keep the server silent (air-gapped installs). The System page says what the check sends, whether it is on or off.

See the code changes between 2.4.2 and 2.5.0

2.4.2 — 2026-11-04

Security

  • A crafted PDF attachment could stall or exhaust the app (pypdf, 1.4.0–2.4.1). Every uploaded PDF is parsed with pypdf to strip its metadata, and anyone can upload one without an account. pypdf 6.21.2 and earlier loop forever or allocate without bound on seven malformed structures. pypdf is now 6.21.4.
  • A malicious LDAP server could make the app spin on its replies (pyasn1, ≤ 2.4.1). python-ldap decodes responses with pyasn1, which before 0.6.5 spends quadratic CPU on four nested or indefinite-length encodings. Only installations with LDAP sign-in that talk to a hostile or compromised directory are exposed. pyasn1 is now 0.6.5.

| CVE | Package | Effect | Fixed in package | Affected OpenWhistle | | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | | CVE-2026-119203 | pypdf | infinite loop, xref trailer search | 6.21.4 | 1.4.0–2.4.1 | | CVE-2026-119204 | pypdf | memory, page tree | 6.21.4 | 1.4.0–2.4.1 | | CVE-2026-119205 | pypdf | infinite loop, cloning dictionaries | 6.21.4 | 1.4.0–2.4.1 | | CVE-2026-119206 | pypdf | runtime, page labels | 6.21.3 | 1.4.0–2.4.1 | | CVE-2026-119207 | pypdf | memory, strict-mode exceptions | 6.21.3 | 1.4.0–2.4.1 | | CVE-2026-119208 | pypdf | runtime/memory, encrypted PDFs | 6.21.3 | 1.4.0–2.4.1 | | CVE-2026-119209 | pypdf | memory, cross-reference streams | 6.21.3 | 1.4.0–2.4.1 | | CVE-2026-119194 | pyasn1 | quadratic CPU, BER/CER/DER containers | 0.6.5 | ≤ 2.4.1 (LDAP) | | CVE-2026-119195 | pyasn1 | quadratic CPU, constructed strings | 0.6.5 | ≤ 2.4.1 (LDAP) | | CVE-2026-119196 | pyasn1 | quadratic CPU, constructed BIT STRING | 0.6.5 | ≤ 2.4.1 (LDAP) | | CVE-2026-119197 | pyasn1 | quadratic CPU, binary REAL | 0.6.5 | ≤ 2.4.1 (LDAP) |

Fixed in OpenWhistle 2.4.2. The image scan also reports CVE-2026-103995 in Python 3.15.2's http.client; no 3.15 release fixes it yet, and the app reaches http.client only through boto3 and the operator's own S3 endpoint (.grype.yaml has the reasoning, the entry expires with 3.15.3).

  • A stolen admin session could outlive the password change meant to end it. The sweep that ends every other session read a page of keys and then fetched and deleted them one by one; a session refresh that stored its new session and deleted the old one in between left the sweep nothing to delete. Measured: the new session still validated after revoke_user_sessions. A deactivation and a reset authenticator end sessions the same way. The sweep is now one Redis script, so nothing runs between its read and its delete.
  • A full nginx disk logged the reporter's address. nginx buffered every request body over 16 KB to /var/cache/nginx — the original attachments, GPS included — and when three uploads at the 55 MB limit filled its 128 MB tmpfs it logged [crit] pwrite() … failed (28: No space left on device), client: <address> at the one level error_log crit keeps, and answered 500. The bundled nginx (compose, behind-proxy, Ansible) now streams bodies to the app, as the Helm Ingress already did; CI replays the upload against the shipped image with a 1 MB temp dir.
  • The setup token could be tried 50 times instead of 10. The lock was read before the token was checked and the failure counted after it, so a burst all read the same count (50 sent together: 50 checked). Tokens are now counted before they are checked, as sign-in attempts are since 2.1.0.
  • A third large upload at once failed with "error parsing the body". The app spools each file over 1 MB to its 128 MB in-memory /tmp; uploads beyond that broke mid-parse (measured with an 8 MB /tmp: three 6 MB uploads at once, one accepted, two refused with 400) — anyone could crowd out a reporter's attachments, and over Tor no address can be throttled. Each multipart request now reserves its size first; one that does not fit gets 503 with Retry-After and a page asking to send it again in a minute.
  • The weekly image rescan covers :edge (what the demo runs) and the arm64 images; only amd64 :latest was rescanned.

Changed

  • § 17 HinSchG deadlines end with their last day (§§ 187, 188 BGB). Received on 1 March, the acknowledgement is due by the end of 8 March; it was due at 8 March 00:00, so an acknowledgement on the seventh day read "Acknowledged (late)" in the PDF export and counted as missed in the SLA rate. Without an acknowledgement, feedback is due three months and then seven days after receipt (received 24 November: 3 March, was 1 March). Migration 020 recomputes stored deadlines.
  • Feedback counts as given when the office writes to the reporter after the acknowledgement, not when the case is closed. A case closed without a word read "Delivered" on the status page, the case page and in the PDF; an answered case stayed "Overdue" — for the reporter too — and was reminded about daily until closed. Feedback sent after the deadline reads "Delivered (late)" in the PDF. Migration 020 takes the first office message after the acknowledgement of existing cases.
  • The demo no longer saves branding. Every visitor signs in as the same admin, and a saved name or logo was what every later visitor saw until the next reset. The page still previews.
  • The file-integrity check also covers migrations/ (run at every start) and scripts/ (ensure_tls_cert.py runs as root). The manifest no longer records its build time, so its SHA-256 is the one python -B scripts/generate_integrity_manifest.py prints in a checkout of the release tag; it matched nothing before. Each replica caches its own result.

Fixed

  • Automatic deletion left the case number in Redis — the reminder marks and the digest queue; the four-eyes deletion has cleared both since 2.4.0.
  • An organisation's dark logo uploaded without a light one was saved and never shown.
  • Without JavaScript (Tor Browser's Safest mode), "Go to status" on the success page was out of the keyboard's reach and announced as disabled, and an error page's "Go back" did nothing.
  • The case page's "Change status" sent nothing until a status was picked and ended on an error page; it is now disabled until then.
  • The success page scrolled smoothly with reduced motion on.
  • Changing one's password, creating an account, a superadmin's reset and the setup wizard hashed with bcrypt on the event loop (~0.25 s for every other request each).
  • German and French said only that closed reports "older than {days} days" are deleted; the count runs from closing.
  • docs-tech/image-scan.md pinned the grype version the workflows had left.
  • The demo's branding page said that it does not save only after a save was refused; it says so up front.

See the code changes between 2.4.1 and 2.4.2

2.4.1 — 2026-10-28

Security

  • A single unauthenticated reporter could stall the whistleblower channel with a crafted PDF. Cleaning a PDF clones every object it reaches — each indirect object and each array/dict entry inside them — and the 10 MB upload cap did not bound that: a 7.8 MB PDF of 60,000 blank pages, one page carrying 60,000 annotations, or a 9.2 MB page carrying 150,000 direct annotation dictionaries (which inflate no object table) each took ~5 s of CPU to clean. /submit is unauthenticated and, with no IP to key on, cannot be rate-limited, so five such attachments per request stall the anonymous reporting channel. Attachment cleaning now counts the objects and entries the clone will visit and refuses a PDF over 20,000 of them before the clone, and scopes pypdf's per-object parse limit to the same budget so no single array or dictionary can be made expensive even to count (worst case now ~0.8 s and independent of how the load is spread, down from ~5 s and unbounded).
  • Dependency floors now encode the security-patched minimums. pillow and pypdf were already resolved to patched versions in uv.lock, so the shipped image was never exposed, but the declared floors (pillow>=12.0.0, pypdf>=6.19.0) still permitted a vulnerable resolution. They are raised to pillow>=13.0.0 and pypdf>=6.21.2, so the lowest permitted version is the lowest safe one and a future lock cannot resolve a vulnerable one back in. pillow decodes attacker-supplied attachments on the unauthenticated /submit path, so its floor is whistleblower-facing; the resolved versions are unchanged.

Changed

  • Design polish: the theme toggle and language picker are 44 px touch targets; form and detail labels are set at weight 600; form controls use the input radius token; the select arrow keeps its contrast in dark mode; the nav loses its border in favour of the shadow it already had.
  • Submit flow: step 1 no longer opens with a reminder to save the case number and PIN before there is anything to save; the success page shows that reminder after the credentials instead of above them.
  • Admin setup pages: adding a user, category, location or organisation now opens in a dialog from the page heading, so the list is the page rather than a form stacked above it. The dialog reopens with the error if a value is rejected, and without JavaScript the form still renders inline. Routes and data are unchanged.

Fixed

  • Copying the case number or PIN gave no confirmation over Tor. The success page's copy buttons fall back to the legacy copy path wherever the Clipboard API is absent — which is every plain-HTTP onion request — but only the Clipboard-API path showed the "copied" tick. A whistleblower on Tor copying a PIN that cannot be recovered saw no sign it had worked. The fallback now confirms the same way, and never falsely: a copy that fails shows nothing, and the code stays on screen to copy by hand.
  • Two older changelog entries cited the wrong law for data retention. The three-year deletion rule is HinSchG § 11 Abs. 5, a deletion deadline — not § 12 Abs. 3, the finance-sector rule, and not a minimum. The citation guard now also scans the publicly rendered CHANGELOG.md and couples the retention basis to § 11 so the pairing cannot return. The HinSchG citation shapes were refreshed to the 25 Sep 2026 amendment (§ 3 now has ten Absätze) and a cite of another law (LkSG) is no longer read as a HinSchG section.

See the code changes between 2.4.0 and 2.4.1

2.4.0 — 2026-10-15

Added

  • Branding page: /admin/branding sets the name, a light and a dark logo and the brand colour, with a live preview in both themes, per organisation (an empty field falls back to the instance default). Logos are PNG, JPEG or WebP, never SVG, and are re-encoded as metadata-free PNG; colours are adjusted so links, button text (hovered too) and tinted badges meet WCAG AA in both themes.
  • Reporters are warned when the proxy passes their address on: a request to /submit or /status that arrives with an address header (X-Forwarded-For, X-Real-IP and the other stripped headers) shows a notice: the server in front may log the address; use Tor Browser or a private device. The onion address is named when ONION_LOCATION is set. The app still discards the address; only the admin was told before.
  • External reporting offices (§13 Abs. 2 HinSchG): /external-reporting names the federal external reporting office at the Bundesamt für Justiz, BaFin, the Bundeskartellamt, the federal states' own offices and OLAF, linked from every footer and the submit sidebar. The law requires the internal reporting office to provide this; nothing did.
  • Legal links in the footer: PRIVACY_POLICY_URL and LEGAL_NOTICE_URL link the operator's privacy notice (Art. 13 GDPR) and legal notice from every page; without a value the link is left out. The admin dashboard says when the privacy notice is missing.

Changed

  • APP_NAME, BRAND_PRIMARY_COLOR and BRAND_LOGO_URL are starting values: what is saved on /admin/branding overrides them.
  • The footer is one compact row: the operator's legal links and the external reporting offices on the left, "Powered by OpenWhistle" on the right. It was 87 px, taller than the 60 px nav, with a tagline, links to GitHub, the HinSchG text and the admin login, and the version.
  • No public version number: the footer shows it to signed-in admins only, /health leaves it out, and CSS and script URLs carry a hash of the file instead of ?v=<version>. A release number on a public page tells an attacker which known flaws to try (OWASP ASVS 4.0.3 14.3.3, BSI APP.3.2.A12).
  • The reporter's pages got a design pass:
    • /submit sits in the header's frame at any window width. On an ultra-wide screen its sidebar was pinned to the left edge, 1,150 px left of the logo at 3440 px, and two thirds of the screen stayed empty.
    • The sidebar is now the brand-coloured promises block DESIGN.md describes, with shorter texts. It sticks beside the form instead of scrolling inside itself.
    • Labels are sentence case instead of mono or tracked capitals: alert titles, case number and PIN labels, review labels, message senders, step names. The eyebrows above the headings are gone.
    • On a phone, the wizard shows "Step n of 6" instead of six step names hyphenated into "Mo-dus".
    • One accent on a neutral page: the promises block, the info alert, the demo banner and box, the office's messages and the progress note are neutral; a status pill is neutral with only its dot coloured. Blue, amber and green fills sat side by side on every reporter page.
  • The admin pages got the same pass:
    • Table headers, the menu's group names, stat labels, the demo badge, the IP warning's title and the internal-note badge are sentence case instead of tracked capitals. The case page and the error page lose their eyebrows.
    • Pages open without an entrance: every panel rose and faded in on every page view, so moving between admin pages showed half-faded panels. Only the reporter's receipt and alerts still move.
    • A case's category is a neutral pill; it looked like the "received" status, dot included. Dates in the case list no longer break after their second hyphen, and the search field is no longer set in mono.
  • LDAP refuses to start without TLS: LDAP_ENABLED needs LDAP_USE_SSL=true or LDAP_START_TLS=true. With the defaults, a plain bind sent the service account's password, then each admin's, in clear text — measured on the wire (ServiceSecret readable in the captured bind).
  • The reporter's draft and status sessions are browser-session cookies: a shared office PC no longer keeps the draft or the open case for the next person after the browser closes. Redis still ends both after 2 h.
  • The PDF export is labelled in the exporting admin's language; every label was English.
  • Every container of the compose stacks and the Ansible role runs with a read-only root, cap_drop: ALL and no-new-privileges; PostgreSQL and Redis keep only the capabilities their entrypoints need. Quick Start's app container had none of it.
  • The Ansible stack serves the onion listener on 127.0.0.1:8080 that its ONION_LOCATION setting and the onion page assume; nothing listened there.
  • The image runs on Python 3.15 (python:3.15-alpine). It brings the poplib control-character fix (CVE-2025-15367) that 3.14 never got; the two .grype.yaml exceptions for 3.14.8 are gone.
  • MAX_LOGIN_ATTEMPTS, LOGIN_LOCKOUT_MINUTES, MAX_ACCESS_ATTEMPTS, ACCESS_LOCKOUT_MINUTES and ACCESS_TOKEN_EXPIRE_MINUTES must be at least 1. LOGIN_LOCKOUT_MINUTES=0 was accepted and locked nothing: EXPIRE 0 deletes the counter as it is written.
  • Ansible: openwhistle_tls_enabled: false sets SECURE_COOKIES=false and an http:// APP_PUBLIC_URL. The role served plain HTTP with Secure cookies, which a browser drops: no admin stayed signed in.
  • Helm: the liveness probe is a TCP check. /health answers 503 while PostgreSQL or Redis is down, so an outage of either restarted every pod; readiness still takes the pod out of service.
  • The receipt in a case's thread is stored in no reporter's language and read in each reader's. A Portuguese browser at a German company showed up on the case page as "Sua denúncia foi recebida".
  • French, Spanish and Brazilian Portuguese reporters read the built-in categories in their language; the translations sat in the locales, read by nothing.
  • The installation count makes at most one attempt a day, failed or not, as the consent text says. A failure was retried hourly: 24 requests a day while the count server was down.

Fixed

  • Two built-in German categories read "Umweltverstoss" and "Datenschutzverstoss"; they are spelled with ß now. A label an operator changed keeps their wording.
  • A citation and a period no longer break across lines: "§ 7 | HinSchG" and "innerhalb von 7 | Tagen" are held together with non-breaking spaces in every language.
  • The demo box on the login page used amber for its button beside the green one, and spaced the demo case numbers far apart; both are neutral now. "active" and "inactive" pills start with a capital, pills without a status are drawn as pills, and the retention and system pages no longer ring a card in the accent colour to say what its pill says. A short admin page no longer shifts the menu sideways.
  • On a phone, a demo case number on /status no longer breaks into two or three lines beside its status badge.
  • A WebSocket handshake put the client's IP address into the app's log: 127.0.0.1:37000 - "WebSocket /status?case=…" 403 on uvicorn.error, which --no-access-log does not silence. The middleware cleaned HTTP requests only. Reachable wherever the app is reached without the bundled nginx (Quick Start, Helm ingress); the address and the address headers now go for WebSockets too.
  • An uploaded PDF left a log line stamped with the second it was uploaded: pypdf warns about every PDF with a wrong cross-reference pointer, which many producers write. pypdf logs nothing now.
  • Whoever could read Redis held a signed-in admin session: the session key was the signed token itself (measured: the key from SCAN, set as a cookie, opened the dashboard, no password, no TOTP). Session, TOTP login and TOTP setup keys are HMACs, as the reporter's have been since 2.3.0. Admins sign in once more after the update.
  • On an unassigned case every admin could reveal the confidential name, one after the other, and the case stayed unassigned — README says the name goes "to the case handler only". Revealing takes the case; the form says so.
  • One wrong PIN held every reporter's and admin's request for 0.2 s: bcrypt ran on the event loop. /health took 3921 ms during 20 parallel wrong PINs (31 ms now). PIN and password checks run in a thread.
  • Every case view loaded every attachment's bytes — the reporter's status page, each reply, the admin case page: up to 50 MB read to list names and sizes. The bytes are read on download only.
  • An SLA reminder that SMTP refused was marked as sent, and the deadline passed without one; it is tried again every 30 minutes.
  • A busy second at 03:00 UTC cost a day's retention run (midnight: the digest): APScheduler dropped a run more than one second late (measured: loop blocked 3 s, job skipped). Late runs still run.
  • Every stop of the stack dropped the queued notices (deploy, reboot, certbot's pre-hook): Redis keeps nothing on disk, and with the default batching that was up to a day of new reports nobody was told about. The app delivers the queue on its way down; Compose stops it before Redis.
  • A superadmin's statistics merged two organisations' categories under one slug and one organisation's label; each organisation's category has its own row.
  • A first LDAP login made an account with no audit entry, and so did the setup wizard; both are recorded as admin.created.
  • An admin of a deactivated organisation could still add accounts to it; refused, as for a superadmin.
  • A draft begun while e-mail was on stored the reporter's address after mail was switched off.
  • Erasing a case left its case number in Redis in the reminder marks, for up to a month.
  • DEMO_MODE seeded public demo logins into a real installation whose own admin is called demo; the seeder recognises its account by its secret, not its name.
  • TLS 1.2 offered suites without forward secrecy: with an RSA certificate nginx negotiated AES128-GCM-SHA256 (openssl s_client). ssl_ciphers allows ECDHE only (bundled nginx, Ansible).
  • The self-signed certificate was kept after it expired (825 days); tls-init renews it 30 days before.
  • Ansible with openwhistle_tls_enabled: false sent HSTS over plain HTTP on nginx's own error pages.
  • Migrations 011 and 017 read DEFAULT_ORG_SLUG from the environment only; a slug set in .env was ignored.
  • The address-header warning was cleared before its dismissal was recorded; a failed audit write lost both.
  • .env.example set POSTGRES_PASSWORD and REDIS_PASSWORD to change-me, which passed docker-compose.prod.yml's "required" check; both are empty.
  • A dispatched publish built and signed :sha-<sha> of any branch; only commits on main are published. A dispatched re-publish no longer scans, and is blocked by, the :latest it replaces.
  • The reset dialog of an LDAP or SSO account said its password would stop working and a temporary one be issued; neither happens.
  • The status page told every reporter whose case was in review that "an investigation has been initiated" and a "final response" would follow; it says the office is reviewing the report and will give feedback on its follow-up measures (§ 17 HinSchG).
  • German, French and Brazilian Portuguese admins were told less than English ones: the 3-year default and "change only on legal advice" (retention), the 4-eyes deletion (GDPR Art. 17), French the 24/7 duty of critical industries. A test compares the numbers of every translation with English.
  • The test suite ran with retention on: conftest switched it off after the settings were built.
  • Guesses sent together got past the sign-in lockout. The count was read, the code checked, the failure counted after: 50 TOTP codes sent at once with the password known got 18 checked against a limit of 10. An attempt is counted before it is checked; a right password gives it back.
  • More traces of the whistleblower left the attachment strip untouched: a PDF page's thumbnail (/Thumb, the page as it was before anything was blacked out); Office core properties anywhere but docProps/core.xml (docProps/Core.xml, System.IO.Packaging's package/services/…); a photo named .jfif or .jpe (EXIF kept); an SVG's <metadata> and inkscape:export-filename; OneDrive addresses (…-my.sharepoint.com/personal/<account>/, d.docs.live.net/<id>/).
  • CloudFront's viewer address and port reached the app, and with it the city, coordinates and network (ASN) that CloudFront, Cloudflare, App Engine, Akamai, Vercel and Netlify add. App and nginx drop all 38.
  • A report closed on 1 March 2027 was deleted on 28 February 2030, a day before HinSchG §11(5)'s three years: RETENTION_DAYS=1095 was counted as days. Whole years are calendar years now.
  • A superadmin saw a case under another organisation's category, on the case page, the dashboard and the PDF export, where two organisations use one slug.
  • Switching a category or location off or on was saved before its audit entry; a failing audit write left the change in place, unaudited.
  • Migration 017 moves an organisation-less case's audit rows with the case; that organisation's admins saw no trail of it, identity reveals included.
  • A second setup link from an earlier sign-in showed the enrolled authenticator's secret for its ten minutes and could start a session.
  • Every visit to /submit stored an empty draft in Redis for two hours (20 visits, 20 keys); nothing limits visits, and a full Redis refuses every write. The first step stores the draft.
  • The Redis room check before storing attachments counted one base64 of them; a draft holds two (10 MB: 14.0 MB counted, 18.6 MB stored).
  • The server refuses a category or location without a name, or with a slug or code the form's pattern refuses; it stored a name of spaces as an empty option in the reporting form.
  • A locked sign-in answered 200; it answers 429, as the second-factor step does.
  • Quick Start bind-mounted ./app/static writable over the image's root-owned copy: the app (uid 1000, often the checkout's owner) could rewrite the JavaScript every reporter loads.
  • cp .env.example .env stopped every start outside a container (the settings refused Compose's own keys), the reset script's placeholder SECRET_KEY outranked .env and sealed --reset-totp's secret with it, and alembic upgrade head ignored a DATABASE_URL in .env and migrated alembic.ini's database.
  • The registry cleanup stayed green when Docker Hub or Quay refused a delete.
  • CI exercises the Ansible stack's onion listener: it forces X-OW-Onion to 1 and drops address headers.
  • A notice sent with NOTIFICATION_BATCH_MINUTES=0 no longer says notices are batched; the retention page says "nothing has been deleted early" only while no report can be old enough; German and French count the three months of feedback from the acknowledgement; the capped-search notice and the retention period use the admin's number format.
  • Attachments kept traces of the whistleblower that the upload form says are removed. A PDF kept the EXIF and GPS of a JPEG behind a second filter ([/FlateDecode /DCTDecode]), the metadata boxes of JPEG 2000 images, a signature's signer name, e-mail, certificate and signing second, and Acrobat's /LastModified. Word and Excel files kept the printer's name (\\server\department-floor), the second of every comment and tracked change, who refreshed a pivot table, the account of a data connection or mail merge, and home-share paths (\\fs01\home$\<name>). All are removed; a signature that cannot be removed refuses the file.
  • Helm: an upload over 1 MB reached the node's disk before its metadata was stripped. /tmp, where Starlette spools it, was a disk-backed emptyDir; it is in memory. The Ingress turns request buffering off: measured with nginx, a 2 MB body became client_temp/0000000001 on disk with buffering on, nothing with it off.
  • A refused reply notice wrote the reporter's private e-mail address into the log, twice, under a line that said "recipient redacted": log.exception printed the SMTP server's refusal, which quotes it.
  • certbot's log kept the address of everyone who opened port 80 during a renewal (Ansible): its standalone server logs each request with the client address at DEBUG, which certbot's file keeps. The post hook removes those lines.
  • Attachments uploaded before v1.4.0 were never encrypted, although "Encryption at rest" says so: migration 016 encrypts those in the database, the S3 startup job those in a bucket.
  • "Link single sign-on" did nothing in Chrome: the CSP's form-action 'self' covers a form's redirects, and the link answered with a 303 to the identity provider. It answers with a page that forwards to it.
  • An SSO login finished in any browser holding the callback URL (login CSRF, up to the second factor): the state is bound to a cookie of the browser that started it.
  • With multi-tenancy, an organisation-less case was open to every organisation's admin — case page and identity reveal — while their case lists hid it. Such a case came from a DEFAULT_ORG_SLUG that named no organisation; it is filed under the oldest one now, and migration 017 moves existing ones there.
  • A PIN typed in capitals was refused and counted as a failure, though "the correct case number and PIN always open your report".
  • One SMTP outage lost the notice that a report had arrived: the digest emptied the queue before sending. A digest no channel took goes back into the queue. A case deleted before the digest leaves it.
  • DEMO_MODE accepted 000000 for any account named demo, demo2 or case_manager, not only the seeded ones; it needs the seed's own TOTP secret now.
  • A content search past its 5,000-case budget said "no results" for older cases it had not searched; it says that they were not searched.
  • The IP headers and the peer address are dropped by the first middleware, as the documentation says; the CSRF middleware ran before it.
  • The PDF's "3-Month Feedback Deadline:" ran into its value ("…Deadline86 days remaining"): the label column was 55 mm, the label 57. It is 70 mm, and a long section heading wraps instead of leaving the page.
  • BRAND_LOGO_URL=/\host/x.png, another server to a browser, is refused like //host/x.png.
  • The README promised notices with "counts only" (e-mail carries case numbers) and an install count that sends "nothing about the instance" (it sends a random ID and the version); the telephone guide tied the case number to the confidential mode.
  • The v2.3.0 publish stopped after GHCR: Docker Hub lists a new signature (cosign 3 stores it as an OCI referrer) seconds after cosign sign, and the check right after it found none. It retries for a minute.
  • scripts/take_screenshots.py died after the last shot without writing _release: it read the version from the checkout's settings, which want a SECRET_KEY. It asks the running app's /health, so the marker names the release the shots show.

See the code changes between 2.3.0 and 2.4.0